@article { vasconcelos15, abstract = {Global coordination for the preservation of a common good, such as climate, is one of the most prominent challenges of modern societies. In this manuscript, we use the framework of evolutionary game theory to investigate whether a polycentric structure of multiple small-scale agreements provides a viable solution to solve global dilemmas as climate change governance. We review a stochastic model which incorporates a threshold game of collective action and the idea of risky goods, capturing essential features unveiled in recent experiments. We show how reducing uncertainty both in terms of the perception of disaster and in terms of goals induce a transition to cooperation. Taking into account wealth inequality, we explore the impact of the homophily, potentially present in the network of influence of the rich and the poor, in the different contributions of the players. Finally, we discuss the impact of polycentric sanctioning institutions, showing how such a scenario also proves to be more efficient than a single global institution.}, journal = {Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences}, keywords = {Game Theory;Miscellaneous;Multi-Agent Societies;}, month = {December}, number = {13}, pages = {2503-2517}, publisher = {World Scientific}, title = {Cooperation Dynamics of Polycentric Climate Governance}, volume = {25}, year = {2015}, author = {VĂ­tor V. Vasconcelos and Francisco C. Santos and Jorge M. Pacheco} }