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The Role of Execution Errors in Populations of Ultimatum Bargaining Agents


Abstract The design of artificial intelligent agents is frequently accomplished by equipping individuals with mechanisms to choose actions that maximise a subjective utility function. This way, the implementation of behavioural errors, that systematically prevent agents from using optimal strategies, often seems baseless. In this paper, we employ an analytical framework to study a population of Proposers and Responders, with conflicting interests, that co-evolve by playing the prototypical Ultimatum Game. This framework allows to consider an arbitrary discretisation of the strategy space, and allows us to describe the dynamical impact of individual mistakes by Responders, on the collective success of this population. Conveniently, this method can be used to analyse other continuous strategy interactions. In the case of Ultimatum Game, we show analytically how seemingly disadvantageous errors empower Responders and become the source of individual and collective long-term success, leading to a fairer distribution of gains. This conclusion remains valid for a wide range of selection pressures, population sizes and mutation rates.
Year 2017
Keywords Game Theory;Multi-Agent Societies;
Authors Fernando P. Santos, Jorge M. Pacheco, Ana Paiva, Francisco C. Santos
Booktitle Conflict Resolution in Decision Making: Second International Workshop, COREDEMA 2016, The Hague, The Netherlands, August 29-30, 2016, Revised Selected Papers
Pages 36--50
Publisher Springer International Publishing
Address Cham
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@inproceedings { santos17, abstract = {The design of artificial intelligent agents is frequently accomplished by equipping individuals with mechanisms to choose actions that maximise a subjective utility function. This way, the implementation of behavioural errors, that systematically prevent agents from using optimal strategies, often seems baseless. In this paper, we employ an analytical framework to study a population of Proposers and Responders, with conflicting interests, that co-evolve by playing the prototypical Ultimatum Game. This framework allows to consider an arbitrary discretisation of the strategy space, and allows us to describe the dynamical impact of individual mistakes by Responders, on the collective success of this population. Conveniently, this method can be used to analyse other continuous strategy interactions. In the case of Ultimatum Game, we show analytically how seemingly disadvantageous errors empower Responders and become the source of individual and collective long-term success, leading to a fairer distribution of gains. This conclusion remains valid for a wide range of selection pressures, population sizes and mutation rates.}, address = {Cham}, booktitle = {Conflict Resolution in Decision Making: Second International Workshop, COREDEMA 2016, The Hague, The Netherlands, August 29-30, 2016, Revised Selected Papers}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-57285-7_3}, editor = {Aydo{\u{g}}an, Reyhan and Baarslag, Tim and Gerding, Enrico and Jonker, Catholijn M. and Julian, Vicente and Sanchez-Anguix, Victor}, isbn = {978-3-319-57285-7}, keywords = {Game Theory;Multi-Agent Societies;}, pages = {36--50}, publisher = {Springer International Publishing}, title = {The Role of Execution Errors in Populations of Ultimatum Bargaining Agents}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57285-7_3}, year = {2017}, author = {Fernando P. Santos and Jorge M. Pacheco and Ana Paiva and Francisco C. Santos} }

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