The “Favors Game”: A Framework to Study the Emergence of Cooperation through Social Importance

Pedro Sequeira, Samuel Mascarenhas, Francisco S. Melo, and Ana Paiva

In Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS ’15). (Extended Abstract) 2015, pp 1899-1900.

The “Favors Game”: A Framework to Study the Emergence of Cooperation through Social Importance

Abstract:
Several agent-based frameworks have been proposed to investigate the possible reasons that lead humans to act in the interest of others while giving up individual gains. In this paper we propose a novel framework for analyzing this phenomenon based on the notions of social importance and local discrimination. We propose a “Favors Game”, where a recipient agent can “claim” a favor to a donor agent, which may in turn “confer” its request at the expense of a certain cost. The proposed framework allows us to study the conditions under which cooperation occurs and the dynamics of the relationships formed within a population.